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Abstract     
Recent years have seen a distinctive transformation in EU economic governance, including the 
introduction of a regime of oversight and recommendation as well as the establishment of new 
policymaking, oversight and expert institutions at both the European and member state levels. These 
changes raise questions about legal and political accountability, and about the current state of 
integration. Debates over the political nature of contemporary economic governance have, thus far, 
ignored the role that the politics of gender may be playing in constructing and legitimising this 
regime. While much research has documented the gendered impacts of this regime, there remains a 
gap in the literature concerning how gender influences the regime itself. This article addresses this 
gap by exploring two ways in which gender politics have shaped and legitimised the new regime. 
First, it explores the gendered nature of economic expertise within EU economic governance. 
Secondly, it explores the framing of the economic crisis, and show how the narratives of the crisis 
helped to create this gendered regime. The article explores the gendered nature of the process of 
seeking legitimacy in economic policy, and so the analysis helps to deepen the understanding of the 
politics behind economic policy more broadly.  
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According to Scharpf (2013), the economic governance regime of the EU can be understood as ‘a 
legally and politically unconstrained expert regime’ (Scharpf 2013: 12). In this reading, not only are 
experts and expertise central to economic governance in the EU, they in fact hold a position of 
uncontested and ‘unconstrained’ influence. There has been a shift away from politicised economic 
governance to the technocratic, an apolitical economic governance regime at the European level 
(Ruser 2015; Guerrina 2017). This shift has taken place at member state level, with the 
empowerment of the executive branch at the expense of parliaments (Maatsch and Cooper 2017; 
Jančić 2016), and at the European level, with a similar sidelining of the European Parliament in 
economic governance (Rittberger 2014; Guerrina 2017; Fasone 2014). 
Like much of the political economy of ideas literature, Scharpf (2013) does not explore the gendered 
nature of this regime. Other political economy research that identifies the specific form of economic 
knowledge (Streeck 2011; Helgadóttir 2016; Fourcade 2006) within European economic policymaking 
does not analyse the gendered nature of governance either. This reflects broader trends in the EU 
studies literature, that have been convincingly critiqued elsewhere (Guerrina, Haastrup, Wright, 
Masselot, et al. 2018). There has been some work that recognises the gendered nature of the 
economic knowledge underpinning the EU’s new governance regime (Guerrina 2017; Bruff and Wöhl 
2016). However, this work takes this recognition as a starting point, rather than investigating how 
such expertise is gendered. There is a similar gap in the debates over the role of professional and 
academic economists in the adoption of austerity programmes in Europe and elsewhere in the early 
decades of the 21st century (Farrell and Quiggin 2012), as well as in the research agenda seeking to 
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understand why ‘bad ideas’ have triumphed in European economy policymaking (Schmidt 
2016;Lehndorff 2012; Blyth 2013a). This literature identifies the role of experts, but for the most part 
it does not focus on how expertise as a narrative is itself part of this policymaking process. 
Additionally, the identified literature does not unpack or examine the gendered nature of expertise 
and expert influence. 
The current EU economic governance regime can be seen as normalisation of the surveillance and 
guidance system developed for the member states which were in receipt of a Troika loan. This 
system of oversight, advice, recommendations and evaluation was represented by the physical 
presence of expert groups in each member state under a bailout programme. Additionally, there has 
been a promotion of a new expert regime through the establishment or, in some cases, an increased 
authority of national level fiscal advisory councils as required by the new rules adopted after the 
crisis. These institutions are specifically charged with providing expert advice to member state 
governments, and also with assisting in the reporting to the expert oversight system at the EU level. 
In this article, I use a discourse analysis approach to examine the gendered nature of EU economic 
governance. More specifically, I apply an approach informed by feminist discourse analysis 
(Lombardo and Meier 2008; Lazar 2007), that appreciates the gendered dynamics of language and is 
attentive to power dynamics within discourses. This approach can highlight the work that gender is 
doing in particular discourses, such as providing coherence to policy programmes (O’Dwyer 2018a). 
The article maps the role of expertise in EU economic governance, identifying the institutional shifts 
that empowered a particular type of expertise, while also sidelining gender equality concerns. It uses 
in-depth analysis of key documents to highlight the centrality of expertise to EU economic 
governance. It also demonstrates the gendered power dynamic that emerges from the dominance of 
‘the expert’, in particular through a process of depoliticisation of decision-making in economic policy. 
In so doing, this article offers an in-depth analysis of the depoliticisation of economic governance, 
while also problematising this process from a feminist perspective. 
FINDING GENDER IN EXPERTISE 
In this section I briefly set out what I mean by a gendered expertise regime. I outline indicators of 
both an expertise regime itself, as well as how it may be gendered. The following sections then 
examine whether such expectations are realised in EU economic governance.  
Historically, there has been a clear link between expertise and gender, including in areas of economic 
expertise. The professions associated with expertise were traditionally closed off to women, and 
even now there tends to be a majority of men in the more senior level of the legal and economic 
professions (Jonung and Ståhlberg 2008; Ginther and Kahn 2004). This historical inequality has left a 
legacy of a particular understanding of expertise. In particular, it has shaped the way that experts are 
expected to look and speak. The public image of the expert is a particularly masculine image. It is also 
infused with racialised and class-based understandings of authority. So, the stereotype of an expert 
is a white, well-educated man, usually in a suit (Griffin 2013; Beneria 1999). This has aligned with 
various dominant types of expertise throughout history, from religious leaders, to philosophers, 
politicians and now, the expression of hegemonic masculinity in the time of advanced and globalised 
capital, that of the ‘Davos man’ (Beneria 1999). Economic expertise is gendered in substance as well 
as style. There is a striking male dominance in the field of economics (Ferber and Nelson 2009; Elson 
1995, 1994; Bakker 2007). For example, in the United Kingdom, women make up just 24 per cent of 
academic economists (Tonin and Wahba 2015). 
Additionally, positions of economic decision-making are male dominated. For example, an analysis of 
the main networks of financial governance after the Global Financial Crisis found an overwhelming 
male dominance in international financial governance, (Schuberth and Young 2011). Of the 76 people 
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awarded the Nobel Memorial prize in economics, only one has been a woman. Economics as a 
discipline and a profession is overwhelmingly male dominated. In a classic example of role-model 
theory, this dominance is self-perpetuating. As the majority of visible economic experts are male, 
male-ness itself becomes associated with economic expertise (West and Zimmerman 1987; Pearse 
and Connell 2015). 
The analysis below documents my investigation of a gendered expertise regime in EU economic 
governance. Potential indicators of a gendered regime include the presentation of expertise as 
independent, objective, apolitical and preferable to other forms of decision-making. The gendered 
nature of such a regime will be observable in a construction of economic expertise that does not 
consider the inclusion of feminist or gender sensitive knowledge, and that does not see the male-
dominance of expert groups and spaces as problematic. Additionally, a gendered expertise regime 
will result in depoliticisation of economic governance. This depoliticisation is discussed next. 
Depoliticisation is not actually a process of removing all politics from a policy space. Rather, it is a 
process of removing some aspects of politics. Put another way, depoliticisation is the shifting of 
decision-making responsibility between political actors. In this sense, it is a very political move 
(Fawcett, Flinders, Wood and Hay 2017). It can serve to exclude ideas and actors through moving 
decisions to more exclusive forums, thus preventing contestation of policy choices. It is an act of 
silencing, and as such is deeply political. Depoliticisation can be both discursive and more structural. 
For example, it can result from a particular narrative around the respective roles of experts and 
elected representatives. But it can also result from the formal institutional rules of a particular policy 
area. Such rules can exclude political actors, while guaranteeing the place of experts or other non-
elected or non-accountable actors. 
Both discursive and structural types of exclusion and depoliticisation have potential gendered 
ramifications. Woodward’s (2004) theory of ‘velvet triangles’ describes the necessary coalitions for 
feminist or gender equality policy to succeed in the EU. She identified three key actors or groups of 
actors in this process. Elected feminist officials, in particular from the European Parliament, work 
with ‘femocrats’ based in the Commission and with feminist academics and activists to collectively 
push forward a gender equality agenda. Subsequent research on the absence or presence of gender 
equality concerns, for example in migration policy, has supported this theory (Kantola 2010; 
Haastrup and Kenny 2016). This research points to the need for all three ‘sides’ of the triangle to be 
present in order to have feminist policy influence. The Velvet Triangle theory is therefore highly 
useful for examining a policy area where there have been changes in the levels of access for feminist 
actors. Depoliticisation prevents the mobilisation of velvet triangles in several ways: by excluding the 
input of the Parliament, by excluding femocrats and their expertise and by portraying gender 
equality concerns as political, and therefore inappropriate for depoliticised policymaking. Thus, 
depoliticisation can be understood as a gendered process, as it acts to exclude feminist analysis and 
to perpetuate gender-blind policymaking. 
DISCOURSE AND THE PROCESS OF LEGITIMACY 
I follow Scharpf (2013, 1999) in his distinction between input and output legitimacy, focusing on how 
output legitimacy is generated in the field of contemporary economic governance. While it has been 
fruitfully applied to discussions on legitimacy at the national level, this approach is also particularly 
useful for describing legitimacy in the EU, since it allows for the analysis of legitimacy even where 
democratic input and oversight may be lacking, or at are least different in character to that 
experienced at a national level. In Scharpf’s (1999) seminal account, legitimate governance meets 
the criteria of both ‘government by the people’ and ‘government for the people’. Input legitimacy is 
concerned with the processes of decision-making and with who participates in that decision-making. 
Input legitimacy is about ‘government by the people’: it concerns whether or not the citizens have an 
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adequate say in the rules that govern them. Decisions have input legitimacy when those taking the 
decisions are legitimate representatives and where all appropriate viewpoints are considered. Input 
legitimacy, then, is clearly often lacking in EU policymaking. 
Therefore, output legitimacy is key in analysing and evaluating legitimacy with regard to EU 
economic governance. Output legitimacy considers the impact of decisions on economic and 
employment performance. Output legitimacy therefore concerns the standard of ‘government for 
the people’. Output legitimacy has often been the focus of defenders of the European Union. In 
particular before the crisis, the benefits of EU membership and of EU legislation were said to 
legitimate the transfer of powers from national governments to the EU level. However, in the wake 
of the economic crisis and the transformation of economic governance that followed, output 
legitimacy has become increasingly contested (Seikel 2016; Jones 2015). These circumstances of 
contested legitimacy highlight the usefulness of understanding legitimacy as a process, rather than as 
a binary state. As Rosamond (2002: 160) notes, ‘the project of economic integration cannot be 
accomplished without intensive activism on behalf of the generation of mass loyalties to “Europe”’. 
Thus, legitimacy is a constant aspiration and a constant process of communication and rhetoric. 
In the aftermath of the crisis, and of the reforms it prompted, the role of discourse in shaping output 
legitimacy is increasingly important for scholarship. Weiler (2012) suggests as much when he points 
to the role of high-profile leaders providing a vision, or narrative, in legitimising the EU. Della Sala 
(2010) explored the role of myths and narratives in legitimising integration (see also Hall 2012) and 
McNamara (2015a; 2015b) has shown that the symbolism of the EU along with economic narratives 
(McNamara 1999, 1998) have served to embed a type of legitimising process that is inherently 
discursive and communicative. While the idea of ‘throughput legitimacy’ (Schmidt 2013) is also 
important for understanding the role of expertise, the focus of this paper is on the role that expertise 
is playing in output legitimacy. One of the key contributions of this paper is to show how this process 
of seeking output legitimacy is deeply intertwined with gender. 
A GENDERED EXPERTISE REGIME 
EU economic governance is built around the assumption of a ‘technocratic’ approach to economic 
decision-making, which assumes that there is a ‘best practice’ model to follow. As Scharpf (2016) and 
others have argued, expertise based decision-making has replaced political contestation (Scharpf 
2016, 2013; Kreuder-Sonnen 2016). This is not a wholly new phenomenon. Throughout its history, 
the EU has been subject to criticism for its emphasis on technocracy or expert-led policymaking. In 
particular, the Commission’s main resources are knowledge and expertise, as opposed to a budget or 
enforcement powers such as a police force. It has used these resources in the on-going power 
contests between the EU institutions (Radaelli 1999; Bartl 2017). There is a complex and often 
opaque network of experts designing, monitoring and implementing the regime. The technocratic 
character of European policymaking is not new and has been well documented (Radaelli 1999). 
This analysis is not intended to be a complete mapping of economic policymaking at the EU level. 
Indeed, due to the informal nature of some such sites of decision-making, any such map will be 
somewhat incomplete. However, this analysis is certainly illustrative, crossing the multiple 
institutions involved, and capturing the gender breakdown of policymaking at various levels of 
authority. Additionally, given the overwhelming trend of male dominance that can be observed, it is 
an important starting point for evaluating the gendered nature of expertise in EU economic 
governance. 
Table 1 outlines the gender breakdown of the key decision-making bodies in the EU’s economic 
governance, covering the Council, Commission, Parliament and the European Central Bank. These 
groups make up the formal architecture of economic governance in the EU. While there is some clear 
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variation, each and every group is male dominated. This is starkest at the top level of decision-
making, with the ‘five presidents’ all currently male. All of these positions have been historically held 
by men, with the exception of the President of the European Parliament, which has been held by 
women twice in its entire history. Within the current Parliament, there is also a, relatively, high 
number of women on the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, though at 23 per cent, it is 
far from a level of equality. It should be noted that some of these groups are populated based on the 
pre-existing position of the members. For example, ECOFIN is the Council configuration of finance 
ministers, and the Eurogroup is made up of finance ministers from Euro area states. As such, they are 
not impacted by direct gender equality initiatives in hiring and promotion. In contrast, the staffing of 
the Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs of the European Commission (DG ECFIN), 
which is subject to such initiatives, has an, again relatively, high number of women, with 32 per cent 
at the administrator level. 
Table 1. Gender breakdown of decision makers in EU economic governance 
Position/Level: Male (%) Female (%) 
President (Parliament, Euro group, European Central 
Bank, Commission, Council) 
5 (100%) 0 (0%) 
DG ECFIN (Commissioner, Director General and Deputy 
Directors General) 
3 (75%) 1 (25%) 
DG ECFIN Director and Head of Unit Level 35 (73%) 13 (27%) 
DG ECFIN Administrator Level 260 (68%) 120 (32%) 
ECB Governing Council 23 (92%) 2 (8%) 
Eurogroup  17 (89%) 2 (10%) 
ECOFIN Council 25 (89%) 3 (11%) 
European Parliament Committee on Economic and 
Monetary Affairs 
47 (77%) 14 (23%) 
Sources: Europa.eu, ECFIN Organisation Chart, Commission Statistical Bulletin Active Staff by Directorate-General and 
Gender, http://www.ecb.europa.eu/. All accurate as of 22 March 2017 
 
Overall this table illustrates a stark imbalance in the make-up of key decision-making sites. This has 
several implications for democracy (Schuberth and Young 2011), for decision-making quality (Walby 
2015), for gender equality moving forward and for the working culture of these spaces (Guerrina 
2017). Table 2 below adds to these observations. It lists the gender breakdown of two key review 
groups on economic governance: the European Council Task Force on Economic Governance, and the 
High Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, appointed by the Commission. Both were tasked 
with reporting on the causes of the crisis and with recommending reforms for the Economic and 
Monetary Union. As can be seen, both groups are male dominated, with the latter completely 
composed of male members. These reports form the basis of the story of the crisis and shaped the 
crisis-era reform of EU economic governance from the beginning. As such, their striking imbalance is 
a strong initial indicator of a gendered expertise regime. 
 
Table 2 - Gender Breakdown of Membership of Review Groups on the Economic Crisis 
Group: Male (%) Female (%) 
European Council Task Force on Economic Governance 35 (92%) 3 (8%) 
High Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU 
(members and secretariat) 
12 (100%) 0 (0%) 
Sources: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2010/10/pdf/strengthening-economic-governance-in-
the-eu-report-of-the-task-force-to-the-european-council/,https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/report-high-level-group-financial-
supervision-eu-chaired-jacques-de-larosiere_en 
 
As Schuberth and Young (2011) note in their analysis of the male dominance of global financial 
governance, there are still pervasive, though perhaps subconscious, biases around women and 
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economic knowledge: ‘the ideological premise that women deviate from economic rationality, that 
they are inherently less rational, less proficient in mathematics, formal economics and science serves 
to justify women’s exclusion’ (Schuberth and Young 2011: 136). These gendered ideas about 
economic decision-making and rationality manifest in many ways, and while they are not nearly as 
prominent in current discourses as they may have historically been, their influence is still observable. 
For example, much work has been done to show how the symbolism and imagery used to describe 
the Global Financial Crisis reflects these gendered ideas about risk and rationality (Hozić and True 
2017, 2016; Griffin 2013). The influence of these ideas about gender can still be seen today in the 
disparities in the academic and professional fields of economics (Kahn 1995; Ferber and Nelson 2009; 
Elson 1995). There are existing biases within our shared social understandings of economics and 
expertise that perpetuate the male dominance of these spaces. These biases create symbols and 
norms about expertise, which combine with existing and historical structural barriers to women’s 
work and education to result in the overwhelming disparities discussed earlier. These biases are what 
make an all-male expert panel seem unremarkable. They are remarkable, however, as observable 
indicators of exactly these biases and discriminations. 
The male-dominated expert groups described above do not just result from biases, they create and 
perpetuate them. Since all people, both men and women, are socially situated beings, they bring 
with them their own particular experience and therefore outlook to decisions. A decision-making 
space that is male-dominated is therefore likely to suffer from such homogeneity, through 
groupthink and lack of diverse opinions. This is not a result of male-dominance itself, but rather a 
result of the lack of diversity (Bartl 2017). As such, when other characteristics such as race and class 
or educational background are so widely shared amongst the group, other biases are also possible. 
This is especially notable given recent work that has shown a marked difference in the outlook of 
male and female economists (May, McGarvey and Kucera 2018). This is not to say that one outlook is 
inherently more correct, but rather to point to the clear connection between gender diversity and 
diversity in economic debates, and so to the connection between homogeneity of decision makers 
and homogeneity of viewpoints. 
Within a set of EU economic governance documents that I have analysed (O’Dwyer 2017), the most 
common description word that accompanies ‘expert’ or ‘expertise’ is ‘independent’. ‘Non-political’ is 
also a common description of experts throughout the documents, in particular when describing the 
makeup of expert or advisory groups (European Commission 2016). Expertise is called upon to 
legitimise the forecasts and reviews of the European Semester, the EU’s annual cycle of economic 
policy coordination, and is presented as the opposite of political. This transfer of economic 
governance from the political sphere to an expertise sphere is clearly important in the legitimising 
strategy of the regime. The exercise of authority needs to be perceived as ‘apolitical’ in order for the 
sort of legitimacy being sought to be considered appropriate, as it is associated with ‘objectivity’. The 
legitimacy being sought is very much of the ‘output’ type, following Scharpf’s (1999) distinction. It is 
also concerned with convincing important external actors and groups of the legitimacy and 
correctness of policy decisions. This type of depoliticisation is often understood as technocracy, or 
the rule by technocrats or experts, and has long been of concern to democratic theorists (Ruser 
2015; Fischer 2009, 1990; Coburn 2016) as well as to feminist scholars (Schuberth and Young 2011; 
Guerrina 2017; Fraser 2013). 
This emphasis on expertise helps to normalise the exclusion of feminist influence on policy decisions. 
As discussed above, for feminist or gender sensitive contributions to have a tangible impact on 
policy, three groups of actors need to cooperate in ‘velvet triangles’. Depoliticisation prevents this 
through the sidelining of political actors, including the European Parliament. The Parliament, in 
particular the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality, has traditionally been a key part 
in ‘velvet triangles’ (Woodward 2004), through raising issues of gender equality and providing both 
resources and a forum for addressing them. Additionally, input from ‘femocrats’ into economic 
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policymaking is increasingly lacking, due in part to the transfer of gender equality policy from the 
European Commission’s Directorate General for Employment to the Directorate General for Justice 
(Guerrina 2017; Cavaghan 2017). This institutional change combines with the discursive mechanism 
of depoliticisation to exclude feminist concerns from economic governance. Indeed, it is not only 
feminist concerns that experience this. Recent work has also highlighted the limited scope for social 
concerns within the European Semester (Dawson 2018; Clauwaert 2015). 
Economic expertise manifests as a transnational phenomenon (Fourcade 2006). It is present in the 
global language of economics – a formalised, mathematical and abstract vocabulary that shapes 
debates on economic policy. Ability to interact in this language is one of the key legitimacy 
requirements for economic decision-making, both at the national and at the EU level. It is a key 
mechanism in reassuring economic markets of policy-makers abilities and aims (Schmidt 2014; Laffan 
2014). It is through this language that the network of economic expertise is delineated. Ability to 
speak it is an essential entry criterion. This network has been analysed before, in the literature on the 
neoliberal economists of the Chicago school (Valdés 1995; Silva 1991), or more recently with regard 
to the EU, in the prominence of graduates of a particular university, the ‘Bocconi Boys’ (Helgadóttir 
2016; Dellepiane-Avellaneda 2015; Blyth 2013b). Both the Chicago and Bocconi boys are indeed 
overwhelmingly male, a trait that goes unremarked by the majority of scholarship on their authority 
and reach. 
This is part of the ‘inevitable homogeneity’ of such expert networks (Lord 2007; Bartl 2017). As 
Schuberth and Young (2011:137) note, in regard to global financial governance, ‘the various 
networks of knowledge-based experts are basically exclusive men’s clubs, equipped with an 
authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge’. Moreover, the male dominance of decision-
making spaces discussed earlier is not simply an example of gender inequality, or a consequence of 
implicit biases about gender and economic knowledge. It is, in fact, a key factor in legitimising the 
authority of those spaces. Quite simply, by being made up predominantly of a specific type of man 
(well educated, white, in a suit), they look like experts. Within male-dominated spaces, male-ness 
confers authority (Sanday 1981; Acker 1990). Additionally, men in such positions of authority and 
expertise do not face the obstacles to being heard that women in similar positions often face (Beard 
2017, 2014). Male dominated economic expert groups perpetuate the stereotypes of gendered 
abilities with regard to economic knowledge, and simultaneously they are themselves perpetuated 
and legitimised through the fact of their male dominance. That the economic governance regime is 
communicated by these paradigmatic experts therefore helps increase the acceptance of this new 
regime among the wider constituency of experts. 
Performance of the role of expert serves ‘the transformation of economic knowledge into a 
technology of political and bureaucratic power’ (Helgadóttir 2016: 394). What is interesting is how 
gender norms about economic expertise serve to normalise, and therefore legitimise the new 
regime. Male-ness is itself an implicit appeal to expert authority. In the same way that the use of 
formalised mathematical language has served to legitimise economic ideas (Helgadóttir 2016; 
Fourcade 2006), simply being perceived as male grants authority to the expert, in ways that are 
excluded to women and those who do not fit the stereotype of the male expert (Griffin 2013; Connell 
and Messerschmidt 2005). The existing male dominance of economic expertise sets an implicit 
expectation about the gender of experts, and men therefore benefit by meeting such an expectation. 
But male dominance in this area arose in part due to a complex collection of assumptions and norms 
around rationality and gender, some of which continue to shape social views on gender today 
(Schuberth and Young 2011; Griffin 2015, 2013). These norms have been observed in public 
perceptions of male and female politicians, in corporate managers and in the classroom (Kahn 1992; 
Johnson, Murphy, Zewdie and Reichard 2008; Huddy and Terkildsen 1993; Bennett 1982; Alexander 
and Andersen 1993). 
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This performance of a particular type of male expertise is, of course, not open to all men. 
Additionally, there are some notable women in key positions of economic policy making. However, 
the overall performance of expertise it is distinctively masculine, in a similar fashion to the 
masculinity of the Davos man or the examples of hegemonic masculinity in security studies and other 
fields (Kronsell 2016; Ferber and Nelson 2009; Connell and Messerschmidt 2005; Beneria 1999). In 
EU economic governance, like in many other fields (Beard 2017), there is a pre-existing image of 
expertise and authority for men, in a way that there simply is not for women. Crucially, by populating 
expert spaces with mostly men, EU economic governance is, inadvertently or not, benefitting from, 
and perpetuating, this bias. 
According to Fischer (1990: 14) ‘expert knowledge and technocratic practices have become key 
political resources sustaining increasingly undemocratic forms of decision-making’. This is what is 
taking place with EU economic governance. As Kreuder-Sonnen (2016: 10) notes, ‘authoritarian 
structures are being stabilized by political and judicial deference to delegated (expert) authority 
which is trusted to expand the normative constraints on delegation only for the sake of a higher 
good, that is, economic stability’. The process of depoliticising EU economic governance involves 
congruence with a wider norm of depoliticised economic governance. From central bank 
independence, to balanced budget laws, this trend of removing economic policy from arenas of 
democratic politics is a key background to the depoliticisation of EU economic governance (Ruser 
2015; Bartl 2017). 
Just as we see an increase in the numbers of women in national parliaments, and in the European 
Parliament (Hughes, Krook and Paxton 2015), economic decision-making is being moved away from 
parliaments towards finance ministries, centralised executives and central banks (Maatsch 2016, 
2015; Jančić 2016). These venues, of course, remain male dominated (Walby 2015; Schuberth and 
Young 2011). While it is not within the scope of this article to investigate the causality of such 
movements, evidence from organisational research into the effects of changing gender 
demographics of occupations suggest that there may be a connection between increasing female 
representation and decreasing authority (Johnson, Murphy, Zewdie and Reichard 2008). This 
gendered expertise regime is legitimised by setting implicit expectations of who experts are that, 
once met, serve to normalise an exercise of authority. It is not an answer to questions of legitimacy, 
but rather a mechanism for preventing the question from being asked in the first place. 
Redistributive decisions take place in the context of gendered societies and economies. This is why 
economic policy can be so easily gendered through omission of gender analysis (O’Dwyer 2018a; 
Elson 1994). An economic policy that ignores the gendered nature of society and the economy 
results in gender bias by omission (O’Dwyer 2018a). Removing this policy from political contestation 
then removes the avenues for alternative analysis, which could counteract this bias. In particular, 
gender analysis is specifically impacted by the depoliticisation through expertise, as gender concerns 
are viewed as explicitly political concerns. Therefore, the third actors in the potential velvet triangle, 
feminist academics or activists, are also excluded (Guerrina 2017). These actors are excluded because 
their concerns are viewed as inappropriately political, and because by the very fact of being 
concerned with them, such actors do not fill the profile of the expert reified in the regime. How this 
dominance of expertise came about can be better understood by exploring the framing narrative of 
the crisis itself, as I do in the following section. 
FRAMING THE DUAL PROBLEMS OF EXPERTISE AND POLITICS 
In this section, I explore the role of the discourse of expertise in the problem framing process. A 
framing process is the way in which the parameters of policy debate are set (Lombardo and Meier 
2008; Laffan 2014; Daviter 2007; Atikcan 2015). The framing draws boundaries around the potential 
policy responses to a problem, and also often implies the best solution. To put it differently, the 
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solution to the problem is embedded within how the problem is described. Two problems arise from 
the framing of the crisis. The first is the problem narrative of the economic crisis as a crisis of 
expertise. This is a story of the crisis as resulting from a lack of appropriate expertise, or a lack of 
compliance with the recommendations of that appropriate (or ‘best’) expertise. Secondly, there is 
the story of the crisis as one of politics itself. In this telling, the crisis resulted from the over-
politicisation of economic policy. Clearly, the implied and embedded solution for this problem is a 
much greater role for experts, and a lesser role for politics. This section presents and discusses an in-
depth examination of two key documents, exploring both what is absent from their analysis, and 
examining key quotations. These papers come from different time points: a European Economy 
paper1 from 2010, ‘The Stability and Growth Pact: Lessons from the Great Recession’ (hereafter 
Lessons) with authors from DG ECFIN, the OECD and the Swedish Fiscal Council, and a Commission 
communication from 2012 ‘A Blueprint for a Deep and Genuine Economic and Monetary Union’ 
(hereafter Blueprint). Both papers focus on EU economic governance reforms in the course of the 
economic crisis. 
THE CRISIS AS A CRISIS OF EXPERTISE 
The Lessons paper seeks to identify the flaws in the pre-crisis economic governance regime and 
connects them to proposed solutions and reforms. As the authors note, ‘crises are catalysts for 
reform and change – they initiate a process of policy learning’ (Larch, Van den Noord and Jonung 
2010: 16). This paper then considers what reforms and changes have become possible in the wake of 
the crisis. As if to drive this point home, the paper opens with the famous quote from former White 
House Chief of Staff, Rahm Emanuel, proposing that ‘you should never let a serious crisis go to waste. 
And what I mean by that is it’s an opportunity to do things you think you could not do before’. 
In Lessons, a primary cause of the crisis is a lack of expertise. This is portrayed as either a lack of 
personnel, or, more often, as a lack of follow through on, or acceptance of, the advice of experts. The 
paper identifies, for example, poor quality statistical and econometric information from some 
member states as a key flaw in the pre-crisis system (Larch, Van den Noord and Jonung 2010). This 
flaw is presented as a result of a lack of expertise. Further, in the Blueprint paper, it seems that it is 
specifically EU level expertise that was lacking: ‘national economic policy-making paid insufficient 
attention to the European context within which the economies operate’ (European Commission 
2012: 3). It states that ‘a major weakness of the pre-crisis surveillance arrangements was the lack of 
systematic surveillance of macroeconomic imbalances and competitiveness developments’ 
(European Commission 2012: 6). The language of this paper is passive, and does not identify who 
exactly will be doing the overseeing and surveillance. However, by looking at the reforms that are 
proposed and have been adopted since, it is clear that it is not elected representatives, but rather 
‘independent experts’ who will be the main actors in this reformed Economic and Monetary Union. 
This narrative of the crisis as a crisis of expertise frames the establishment of a network of national 
fiscal councils, and at the European level, the European Fiscal Board. This board, which contains one 
woman in its membership of five, is made up of ‘respected international experts’ (European 
Commission 2016). While the documentation of the board insists that the selection process for the 
board membership did aim to ‘strike a balance in terms of […] gender’ (European Commission 2016), 
this clearly has not resulted in an even or ‘balanced’ representation. This expert group is mandated 
to provide an independent assessment of national level budgets but is also charged with leading 
public debate on economic governance. As such, it is the expertise of the European Fiscal Board that 
is supposed to frame the discussion of EU economic governance, by establishing a basis of expert 
knowledge that informs debates at both the European and national level. It is therefore within the 
power of the experts to close off certain avenues of critique or analysis, this being reflected in how 
they frame the debate. 
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Finally, it is worth noting the absence of gender analysis from this narrative of the crisis. Issues such 
as gender inequality in the economy, or in particular the divergence in gender inequalities across 
member states, are not considered or even mentioned. In none of these key documents is there a 
consideration of the absence of gender expertise. Put another way, none of these documents 
considers the lack of implementation of gender mainstreaming to be worth investigating. 
Interestingly, the same cannot quite be said for the Global Financial Crisis, where part of the 
narrative of the crisis involves a gender analysis of decision-makers, perhaps best typified in the 
question of whether the crisis would have happened if ‘Lehman Brothers had been Lehman Sisters’ 
(Walby 2010; Hozić and True 2016). While this narrative is essentialist and partial and has not led to 
the inclusion of gender concerns in post crisis reforms in the US or elsewhere, it is still notably 
different from the narrative of the euro crisis. The consequence of this absence of any gender 
analysis is visible in the resulting solutions to crisis, both proposed and implemented. If a gender 
analysis is never part of the framing discussion of the problem, it becomes even less likely to be 
involved in the solution. 
THE CRISIS AS POLITICS – ‘JUNCKER’S CURSE’ 
‘We all know what to do, we just don’t know how to get re-elected once we have 
done it’ - Jean-Claude Juncker. (quoted in Larch, Van den Noord and Jonung 2010: 
26) 
This formulation from the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, seems to 
strike a chord with many politicians and analysts. It reflects the bind which governments supposedly 
find themselves in when attempting to govern modern capitalist societies experiencing a crisis. The 
necessary adjustments or reforms to save the economy are too politically unpalatable to be applied. 
While both the Blueprint and Lessons papers that have been analysed above conclude with remarks 
of varying vagueness concerning strengthening democratic legitimacy, electoral and representative 
politics are presented as barriers to reform, and even a cause of the crisis.  
Understandably, the criticisms of democratic politics in these papers are often indirect. The Lessons 
paper identifies a ‘key pathology’ of economic policy: pro-cyclical decisions in good times. It also 
connects the failure of expertise to prevent the crisis with an implementation failure of member 
state governments. Discussing the sluggish pace of economic reforms, it refers to the ‘difficulty of 
most democratic governance structures to reconcile heterogeneous and conflicting interests’ (Larch, 
Van den Noord and Jonung 2010), despite that being, of course, one of the purposes of democratic 
government. The language of ‘pathology’ implies that this type of pro-cyclical policymaking is 
inevitable, rather than the outcome of democratic contestation (Larch, Van den Noord and Jonung 
2010). As such, the paper is not criticising democracy directly, but by describing what the authors 
view as an inevitable consequence of democratic politics as a contributing factor to the crisis, they 
establish the grounds for removing democratic control. 
At the level of EU politics, the paper singles out the crisis of the Stability and Growth Pact, where 
France and Germany went unsanctioned for their non-compliance with their fiscal obligations under 
the pact in 2003. The paper identifies ‘the large degree of discretion with which fiscal surveillance is 
implemented and the ultimate power of the Member States within the Council to implement or not 
to implement the provision [for sanctions]’ as the main challenge to be addressed. What resolves 
these difficulties of representative politics is, of course, the crisis: ‘the only element that is 
consistently found to spur reforms is crises: they amplify the sense of urgency and/or boost the costs 
of non-reform’ (Larch, Van den Noord and Jonung 2010: 26). This story continues in the Blueprint, 
‘the introduction of the reverse qualified majority rule significantly strengthens the Commission’s 
hand in decisions relating to sanctions on euro area Member States’ (European Commission 2012: 5). 
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Speed and efficacy are key concepts in this discourse of justifying the removal of decisions from 
spaces of representative politics. The Blueprint praises the actions of the European Parliament which 
prioritised ‘bringing the legislative proposals quickly into force’, and the Council’s decision to 
delegate the formation of its position to the Task Force, which ‘enabled a swift emergence of 
consensus among member states in support of the proposals by the Commission’ (European 
Commission 2012: 4). Speed and efficacy are often valorised in the pursuit of technocratic or expert 
led governance (Radaelli 1999; Fischer 1990), and their dominance can serve to exclude other values 
such as sustainability and equality, meaning they can play a role in building a masculinist technology 
of governance (Wöhl 2016; Bruff and Wöhl 2016). 
The analysis of these key documents chosen from across the timeline of the reform of EU economic 
governance indicates a consistent and coherent view on the trade-off between efficiency and 
democracy. They demonstrate the rhetoric that enabled the emergence of the expertise regime in 
EU economic governance and indicate why this regime has led to such depoliticisation of economic 
governance. By limiting the input of national parliaments and the European Parliament in the 
economic governance system (Maatsch 2016; Guerrina 2017; Fasone 2014), the new regime closes 
off potential input from the spaces which, historically, have been the most likely to raise concerns of 
gender inequality (Woodward 2004; Lombardo and Meier 2006; Kantola 2010). The framing of the 
crisis as both one of a lack of expertise, and one of politics more broadly, has created a regime of 
policies without politics. This raises the question of who is being spoken to by the new regime, if not 
the voting or political public. And so, the analysis of this framing highlights the connections between 
expertise and output legitimacy that have been the focus of this paper. 
CONCLUSION 
It is commonplace today to say that we live in the age of expertise. Expert knowledge 
is indeed one of the most distinctive features of modern society: it is tightly woven 
into the very fabric of our existence. (Fischer 1990: 13) 
Expertise is not, in itself, harmful. It is also not intrinsically anti-democratic. Expertise can inform 
democratic deliberation and guide decisions, in particular in technical areas. What I have argued in 
this paper is that there is a specific type of expertise dominant in the EU’s economic governance 
system, and that this understanding of expertise is being deployed to legitimise the economic 
governance reforms that were initiated as a reaction to the euro crisis. This paper has explored 
Scharpf’s (2016: 28) claim that ‘in short, the present euro regime can only be maintained through a 
depoliticized technocratic regime on the European level’. 
I have additionally discussed the gendered nature of depoliticisation by looking at who the experts 
are in EU economic governance, highlighting the overwhelming male dominance of the key decision-
making spaces, and of the expert groups that informed economic governance reforms. I have shown 
how this expertise is normalised, and how it resulted from the framing of the economic crisis as a 
crisis of expertise, and a crisis of politics. Finally, I discussed how the particularly gendered idea of 
expertise, through its compatibility and congruence with wider ideas of economic expertise and 
depoliticised economic policymaking, has served to legitimise EU economic governance since 2008. 
This is particularly important since there has been a growing consensus that EU economic 
governance lacks democratic input legitimacy (Kreuder-Sonnen 2016; Gearty 2015). 
In a context where the crisis era reforms to the EU’s economic governance system have become 
increasingly normalised (Cavaghan and O’Dwyer 2018), and as this system is being broadened out to 
incorporate social policy (Dawson 2018), it is essential that our understanding of the ideas of 
expertise that are underpinning and legitimising this regime incorporate an analysis of gender, such 
as that outlined in this paper. Moreover, this analysis which, helps us to understand the connections 
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between authority and gender, race, and other identities seems to be a crucial step in interpreting 
and analysing our contemporary politics (O’Dwyer 2018b). 
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ENDNOTES
 
1 The Commission’s European Economy paper series are not explicit representations of Commission positions, but rather 
they set the background for policy debates and discussions 
(http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/archive_en.htm). 
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